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Abstract 
This paper focuses on the transmission of bank liquidity shocks in Loan and deposit in emerging markets. First, we 
attempt to identify factors affecting the credit strategy of foreign banks in emerging countries. Second, we test 
whether depositors exert market discipline on foreign subsidiaries. By combining financial variables of subsidiaries 
and their parent banks and macroeconomic variables of host and home countries, we investigate the factors that 
may affect the behavior of depositors. Our empirical approach is based on a Partial Least Squares-Path model that 
allows us to indentify the causal relationships between the various groups of variables. Our results show that 
foreign bank lending is determined by the specific financial variables of the parent bank and macroeconomic 
variables of the country of origin. This support that the strategy's credit of foreign subsidiary is centrally managed 
at the parent bank and credit supply of subsidiaries depends primary on the financial situation of its parent bank. 
Finally we find evidence of market discipline exercised over foreign subsidiaries in emerging countries. We show 
that market discipline is strongly affected by the specific characteristics of the subsidiary. 
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I. Introduction 
The world today is characterized by 
perfect capital mobility which has 
accelerated the transmission of shocks 
from developed to emerging countries. In 
the literature, it is argued that large banks 
have played an important role in the 
transmission of liquidity shocks through 
their subsidiaries established in foreign 
countries. Thus, some studies have 
concluded that the existence of subsidiaries 
of foreign banks in emerging countries 
favor the transmission of liquidity shocks 
to banks from developed countries to 
emerging countries. Haas and van Lelyveld 
(2010) show that the strength of the parent 
bank is an excellent guarantee that attracts 
credit applications and deposits. In 
addition, the subsidiary is not completely 
autonomous and is part of a group where 
the parent bank centrally manages the 
liquidity of its subsidiaries. 
Foreign banks have significantly 
expanded their range of activities in 
emerging economies. Traditionally, they 
mainly offered financial services to 
international companies. However, since 
the 90s, they are increasingly attracted by 
the prospect of growing profits in local 
markets. Basically, foreign banks has no 
longer a passive response quite changing 
needs of existing customers, but a dynamic 
exploration of new markets in the host 
country. The distress of many emerging 
banking systems has caused the 
phenomena of credit crunch, an extreme 
form of rationing behavior. 
The 2007-2009 crisis experienced 
by large international banks brings up the 
problem of destabilizing role of parent 
banks in host countries which leads to the 
vulnerability of their banking systems 
countries. Pressures on liquidity and 
capital that international banks undergoing 
in the EU have affected national banking 
systems of Central and Eastern Europe. In 
particular, liquidity problems in the parent 
companies have the incentive to reduce the 
funding of their subsidiaries in CEE. 
 
Data from the BIS bank lending by 
foreign banks show that local currency 
loans granted by any subsidiaries of 
foreign banks CEE declined from March 
2008 to June 2008 in most emerging 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe. 
For Havrylchyk (2009), the decline of local 
debt was mainly due to the deprecation of 
the currency and cross-border debt is due 
to credit lines from their foreign 
subsidiaries decreased banks. There was 
instability and movement of bank capital 
and the role of developed countries of the 
European Community in funding foreign 
banks proved risky. 
While the evolution of foreign bank 
participation in the development of 
investment opportunities and risks in 
emerging economies, increased 
competition in traditional markets has 
forced international banks to seek new 
areas of expansion. Improved measurement 
and risk management has facilitated the 
development of financial institutions in 
emerging countries. On the one hand, they 
have learned to quantify and manage the 
market risks and credit support standard 
models. On the other hand, the 
consolidation of macroeconomic policy 
frameworks and increased reliance on 
market forces probably standardized nature 
of risks in relation to the developed world.  
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The aim of our paper is to identify 
factors affecting the credit strategy of 
foreign banks in emerging countries. As 
has been suggested by several researchers 
that one possible way for the reversal in 
lending is the financing of foreign banks, 
we extend our analysis to more focusing on 
market discipline. In particular, we 
investigate whether the characteristics of 
subsidiary and parent bank can explain the 
behavior of deposits. 
 
The problem of transmission of 
liquidity shocks has been widely discussed 
in the context of emerging countries. Major 
studies in this context show that the 
strategy of credit may be affected by 
specific characteristics of both subsidiaries 
and parent banks. But it was also proved 
that the macroeconomic conditions of the 
country and the mother country home may 
also affect the credit subsidiaries. Allen et 
al.(2012) show that foreign bank lending is 
determined by different factors in 
emerging markets and in developed 
countries. They show  that parent bank 
fragility negatively affects lending by 
subsidiaries. Among the macroeconomic 
variables, economic growth and exchange 
rate matter only for developing countries. 
Furthermore, they also observe a 
significant impact of market structure on 
the lending growth in the developing 
countries.  
But one limit their models is that 
macro variables of emerging country can 
be themselves affected by macroeconomic 
variables of developed country. Similarly, 
the home country macroeconomic 
variables can also affect specific 
characteristics of the parent bank which is 
located in a developed country. This 
presents a major problem of colinearity 
between the variables considered in the 
same model. In this study we remedy this 
limit by considering a type econometric 
approach PLS Path which will allow us to 
take account of interdependent 
relationships between different groups of 
variables. 
Chin (2000) and Esposito (2008) 
among other show that the PLS has the 
important advantage is that that it requires 
no assumption on multinormality of the 
data. However, this condition is rarely met 
in finance. It is this advantage that has led 
us to favor this approach in the context of 
our practical application. 
The rest of the paper is organized 
as follow. Section 2 presents a literature 
review on the role of foreign affiliates in 
the transmission of liquidity socks in 
emerging countries. The third section 
describes our methodology and the 
database used in this study. The following 
section provides a synthesis of the results. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
II. Lending shock transmission to 
emerging countries by bank 
subsidiaries and market 
discipline 
a. Lending shock transmission by 
bank subsidiaries 
 
The last financial crisis and the need for 
sound banking systems have opened the 
opportunities to invest in financial 
institutions and to develop activities in 
emerging countries. Monetary authorities 
in these areas attempted to overcome this 
crisis by accelerating the liberalization of 
their financial sectors to facilitate the 
recapitalization of banks and the 
concentration of the banking sector. 
The expansion of credit via foreign banks 
also poses problems of financial stability 
authorities of the host country. The 
invasion of the emerging country by 
foreign banks had direct effects on the 
transmission of credit shocks from 
developed countries to developing 
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countries. The activity of foreign banks is 
strongly focused on lending through local 
institutions affiliated. The ratio of local 
claims in local currency on the total 
foreign claims (international and local 
currency) held by foreign banks has 
significantly increased in all emerging 
regions. Bank subsidiaries may affect the 
economies of the emerging country in two 
ways. First, a crisis liability that often 
occurs as banking panic and is derived 
from the random nature of depositor’s 
withdrawals. This is based on the 
polarization of depositors’ expectations 
and surely marks the limits of the policy’s 
deployment banking strictly individual. 
Second, a crisis of assets which is due to 
the irreversibility of the lending 
relationship: if a negative shock affects the 
profitability or chronic repayments for 
loans already made, then the bank is facing 
a liquidity risk, which itself may cause a 
race to liquidity. 
Loans of subsidiaries contribute to 
the financing of the growing demand for 
domestic credit. Heavy dependence on 
external capital exposes the foreign 
subsidiaries to the risk of non-renewal of 
funding, even at the risk of sudden 
withdrawal of capital. The experienced 
liquidity crisis by the global banking 
system during the financial year 2008-2009 
had particularly affected Muslim countries. 
Financing difficulties of parent bank and 
risk premiums rising have reduced funding 
for subsidiaries. In addition, the 
deterioration of the general economic 
situation led foreign banks to re-evaluate 
the risks in host markets and tougher 
lending conditions abroad. 
Arvai et al. (2009) present different 
two contagious channels that can be 
carried through inter-bank linkages and 
relationships’ parent / subsidiaries. The 
first channel, the problems of liquidity or 
solvency of a subsidiary may affect its 
parent, which feeds back on its other 
subsidiaries in other host countries through 
the channel of the common creditor. The 
parent banks of subsidiaries operating in 
host countries are in spin affected. A 
variant of this channel implies also that 
subsidiary wants to reduce its exposure, for 
reasons of portfolio diversification. This 
translates withdrawals of deposits or the 
rising cost of financing the subsidiary, 
which can cause liquidity problems and 
affect, through the money market, other 
banks in the host country, as well as their 
parent and the markets in which they are 
active. The second channel, the problems 
of liquidity or solvency of the parent affect 
its subsidiaries, which is propagated by 
inter-bank linkages or through distrust in 
the banking system, the banks of the host 
country, and, in turn, impact their 
respective parent companies. 
Shnabl (2011) suggests that the 
efficient market theory suggests that as 
long as investment opportunities are 
constant, shocks to financial institutions in 
one market should not affect lending in 
other markets. Then, if financing frictions 
prevent financial institutions from 
accessing alternative financing sources to 
cover shortfalls, then liquidity shocks in 
one market may affect lending in other 
markets. Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012) 
show that the critical description of the 
bank lending channel is that banks’ 
experience of a funding shock. If they 
cannot substitute liabilities with other 
external funding sources, such as by 
issuing certificates of deposit or attracting 
money market funds, the shock is 
transmitted to the asset’s side of their 
balance sheets. Martinez Peria et al. (2002) 
and Haas and van Lelyveld (2006, 2010) 
suggest that subsidiary banks do not 
change their lending strategies in times of 
local crisis. 
Bernanke and Blinder (1988) and 
Bernanke and James (1991) tested the 
relationship between liquidity and changes 
in loans. They demonstrate that changes in 
the liquidity of real consequences on loan 
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strategies of banks. However, these studies 
have ignored a number of variables such as 
economy wide productivity shocks that 
affect both changes in supply and demand 
of loans at the same time. Loupias, 
Savignac and Sevestre (2003) and 
Gambacorta (2005) show that liquidity 
positions of banks affect how banks react 
to a monetary shock in several European 
countries. 
Claessens et al., (2009) suggest that 
foreign subsidiaries may be a factor of a 
financial instability. In fact, the relaxation 
of restrictions on foreign bank’s entry can 
bring risks. Particularly, by increasing 
competition and thereby lowering the 
profits of domestic banks, foreign entry 
may reduce charter values of domestic 
banks, making them more vulnerable. This 
may have a destabilizing effect on the 
financial system especially if the domestic 
prudential regulations and supervision are 
not sturdy.   
From a public policy standpoint, 
Peek, J. and E. Rosengren  (1997) indicate 
that credit flows by global banks will is 
influenced by both domestic and foreign 
conditions. Moreover, a bank’s 
capitalization will not be a sufficient 
statistic for predicting its willingness to 
lend. Nonperforming loans, even those yet 
to be reflected in capital ratios or publicly 
disclosed, can alter the willingness of 
global banks to lend. 
Based on a sample of 45 banking 
groups, De Haas and van Lelyveld (2010) 
tried to explain the supply of credit by 
banking subsidiaries of the macroeconomic 
environment in the host country by country 
the financial characteristics of the 
subsidiary of its parent company and other 
subsidiaries. Their results support the 
existence of an internal capital market 
banking groups, in which the parent bank 
manages the supply of credit to their 
subsidiaries. They emphasize two effects: a 
substitution effect which arbitrates 
between the parent company and its 
subsidiaries, changes in financial support 
depending on the state of the host country 
and the expected returns and the effects of 
support (means effect) by which parent 
bank  support weaker subsidiaries (capital 
and liquidity). Thus, the subsidiaries would 
be protected against shocks from the host 
country and depends on the situation of the 
parent company and the country of origin. 
 
b. Market discipline of foreign 
subsidiaries 
Market discipline can be described 
as a situation in which depositors penalize 
riskier banks by withdrawing deposits. 
Market discipline was stated by the Basel 
regulatory framework as one of the three 
pillars required for the stability of the 
international financial system. Market 
discipline is widely adopted by regulatory 
authorities to limit bank risk-shifting 
incentives that are exacerbated through a 
financial safety net. According to Berger 
(1991), market discipline in the banking 
sector is generally interpreted as a situation 
where the costs incurred by the partners of 
the bank on the risk of bank risk and react 
on the basis of these costs. Thus, the 
analysis of market discipline can be 
reclined through problems that may exist 
between agencies, mandating and agent. 
The applicant (which is the principal) 
wants to ensure that the bank (agent) 
protects its assets. Thus, applicants will 
respond to any increased risk of the bank 
through prices or quantities, demanding 
higher interest rates on their deposits or 
withdraw completely. This leads to 
penalize banks following an excessive risk-
taking. 
We address this issue by asking the 
question whether depositors require 
controlling risk-taking by foreign 
subsidiaries in emerging countries. The last 
global financial crisis has sparked a debate 
on incentives that may assist depositors to 
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discipline risk-taking by their banks. 
Klapper and Love (2002), Mitton (2002) 
note that market discipline which is an 
essential factor for banking stability is low 
in emerging countries and remains under 
the influence of banking regulations. 
Indeed, the regulatory and supervisory 
practices and institutional factors greatly 
influence and even alter the mechanisms of 
discipline. 
Heavy dependence on external 
capital exposes subsidiaries in host 
countries to the risk of non-renewal of 
funding (funding risk), even at the risk of 
sudden withdrawal of capital. The liquidity 
crisis experienced by the global banking 
system in 2008-2009 has particularly 
affected Muslim countries. Financing 
difficulties of parent banks and rising risk 
premiums have reduced funding for 
subsidiaries. In addition, the deterioration 
of the general economic situation led 
foreign banks to re-evaluate the risks in 
emerging markets and tougher lending 
conditions abroad.  
Depending on the funding strategy 
adopted, parents’ banks can delegate more 
responsibility to their subsidiaries in terms 
of collecting deposits in host country. 
Consequently, parent banks isolate their 
foreign subsidiaries by reducing the 
available funding. In many countries, the 
reduction in funding foreign subsidiaries 
may have destabilized the entire system. 
According to Herring (2007), the risk is even 
more severewhen the foreign subsidiaries 
with significant shares in host markets 
become systemically important, while at 
the same time, they are not so important 
for the parent bank because of their small 
size relative to multinational banking 
group. 
Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988) 
and Diamond and Dybvig (1983) support 
that failure to respond to liquidity 
problems can cause bank insolvency in the 
short term and induce contagion effects. 
The risk undergoing by the banking system 
is that the failure of an insolvent bank can 
lead depositors of other banks to withdraw 
their deposits. Allen et al. (2010) show that 
liquidity needs determine the change in 
deposits in developing economies, 
especially during the recent crisis whereas 
market discipline is relatively more 
dominant in developed countries. De la 
Torre et al. (2003) evidence that bank 
fundamental indicators tend to be less 
important in explaining the evolution of 
deposits banks in emerging countries.  
The conclusions of our paper are 
relevant to the academic literature on 
market discipline in at least two 
dimensions. First, we show that market 
discipline in developing countries depends 
on the risk directly taken by the depositor. 
This is will be shown by the fact that the 
evolution of deposits depends on 
fundamentals of the subsidiary and also on 
macro-economic characteristics of the host 
country. The specific variables of the 
mother and the macroeconomic variables 
bank do not affect the behavior of 
depositors in emerging countries. Second, 
market discipline is a fact that can 
characterized the banking sectors in 
emerging markets and regulatory 
authorities should establish prudential 
provisions necessary to strengthen 
discipline in their markets. This is 
especially necessary, when it is shown that 
this discipline depends on systemic risks 
that affect the fundamentals of banks. 
III. Methodology and data 
In this study we investigate the 
transmission of liquidity crises from 
developed to developing countries through 
foreign subsidiaries. De Haas and van 
Leyveld (2010) show that loan growth of 
foreign subsidiaries is not only determined 
by their own characteristics but also by the 
characteristics of their parent bank and the 
variables of host countries. Following their 
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approach, we use the annual change of the 
logarithm of total loans of a subsidiary 
(ΔLoans) as the variable that describe the 
loans strategy of the subsidiaries. 
In our work, we present a stylized 
model, which specifies the loan supply 
decision of bank subsidiaries in light of 
four blocks of exogenous latent variables; 
the two first groups are specific variables 
of subsidiaries and their parent banks. The 
third and the fourth groups are 
macroeconomic variables of origin and 
host country, respectively. Specific 
financial variables banks for subsidiaries 
and parent banks include, return on equity 
(ROE), equity to total assets (equity), 
assets liquid to total assets (liquidity) and 
we consider provisions for loan losses to 
net interest income (Loan Loss Provisions) 
as a proxy for credit risk following.  
We expect that the capitalization of 
subsidiaries affect positively loan growth, 
since credit transactions are generally 
linked to effective and a real business 
which is based on risk sharing between the 
bank and its customers. However, non-
performing loans’ provision should have a 
negative sign, as banks reduce exposure in 
countries where they are experiencing 
problems. We include a variable size 
(Size), as a variable control, defined as the 
logarithm of total assets. Gambacorta 
(2005) shows that bank size is irrelevant; 
small banks are not more sensitive to 
monetary policy shocks than large banks.  
The same specific variables are 
used to describe the financial situation of 
the parent bank and to construct the latent 
variable Parent fundamentals. 
 The third and the fourth group of 
variables consist of macro-economic 
variables of host country of the subsidiary 
and the origin country of parent bank. We 
include the growth rate of GDP (GDP 
Growth) and the real exchange rate of the 
U.S. dollar (Real Exchange Rate). We 
expect that lending by foreign banks 
increase with the local GDP and 
appreciation of the local currency.  
The study of the effect of GDP on 
the credit supply is carried by the 
assumption that better economic conditions 
increase the investor’s optimism. A higher 
exchange rate results in higher imports 
prices and in turn, increases domestic 
prices. Accordingly, a higher exchange rate 
reduces exports’ prices and thus leading to 
a higher demand for exports, Kia and 
Darrat (2007). As a result, the higher 
demand for resources creates a pressure on 
domestic prices and hence increases loans 
in Islamic banks. 
In addition, to test whether the 
structure of the banking sector's liquidity 
affects the transmission of liquidity shocks 
we include the variable (Concentration). 
The concentration of the banking sector 
implies the importance of local banks in 
the host country. We estimate that more 
high concentration lower the role of 
foreign subsidiaries in the transmission of 
liquidity shocks. 
In a following step, to test the 
existence of market discipline and to 
identify its mechanism, we use the change 
in bank deposits (ΔDeposits) as measure 
for market discipline. We assume that a 
double evaluation of risks by both the 
counter-party and the bank should help 
introduce a healthy discipline in the whole 
banking business and eliminate a range of 
undesirable lending practices.  
The sample used in this study focuses on 
banks' subsidiaries existing in emerging 
countries and whose parent banks are 
located in developed countries. We collect 
data on 590 foreign subsidiaries operating 
in emerging countries and that are 
associated with 270 parent bank which 
operate in developed countries. This paper 
combines financial data of subsidiaries and 
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macroeconomic variables of both host and 
home countries to investigate determinants 
of loans shock transmission from 
developed to emerging countries. The 
financial information on subsidiaries was 
collected from Bank scope data base. 
Table1 provides descriptive statistics of 
our sample. The table shows that total 
assets of parent banks are on average much 
higher than those subsidiaries. However, 
liquidity and the ROE subsidiaries exceed 
those of parent banks.
 
Table 1. Summary statistics of all subsidiaries 
 
To test the impact of each group of 
variables on both credit strategy of foreign 
subsidiaries and market discipline exerted 
by the depositors in emerging markets, we 
apply a consistent econometric approach 
PLS Path that allows us to estimate 
complex causal relationship between latent 
variables measured themselves by called 
manifest observed variables. 
PLS is a structured equation modeling 
technique that can analyze structural 
equation models (SEMs) involving 
multiple-item constructs, with direct and 
indirect paths. This approach is a method 
of analysis to study the impact of a number 
of blocks of variables on the same 
individuals (Tenehaus, 1998). The PLS 
method works by extracting successive 
linear combinations of the predictors and is 
effective in explaining both response and 
predictor variation. The PLS Path 
regression is a powerful approach for 
analyzing models because of the minimal 
demands on measurement scales, sample 
size, and residual distributions. The 
emphasis of PLS is on predicting the 
responses as well as on understanding the 
underlying relationship between the 
variables.  
Generally, groups of variable have 
some particular features such as high 
correlations. This leads to a problem of 
multicolinearity and makes it difficult 
predictive modeling using classical 
regression methods. Hence, the use of 
structural equation models of latent 
variable. 
In our research we consider six groups of 
variables, each of which is determined by i 
manifest variables: Let Xij be the vector of i 
manifest variables of the latent variable j. 
Each group variable is observable 
expression of a latent variable ξj whose 
average is denoted mj. 
A hierarchical classification of 
manifest variables is first performed to 
obtain blocks of variables representing the 
latent variables in the model to estimate. 
The causal relationships between these 
blocks are made with partial correlations. 
Then, the external model is 
specified with the reflective mode to the 
extent that manifest variables were chosen 
so that they reflect the dimension to which 
they refer.  
We consider the following causal 
model: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Banks Subsidiaries Parent banks 
 
Mean Std. dev Mean Std. dev 
∆ Ioan 0.037 1.837 0.182 0.631 
ΔBank Deposits 0.169 1.521 0.071 2.998 
Total Assets 3681 11.632 15972 23.061 
Loan Loss 0.391 2.635 1.517 4.713 
Equity 0.422 2.641 0.572 8.671 
ROE 0.731 4.729 0.341 2.742 
Liquidity 0.389 2.631 0.277 3.974 
Interbank 5.363 0.644 2.731 6.370 
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Figure 1. The PLS-PM model
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The estimation procedure consists 
of two types of estimates of latent variables 
and the estimation of structural equations. 
 
 
- The estimation of latent variables: 
 
Latent variables ξj are estimated in 
two ways: the yj estimated from the 
manifest variables Xji and internal estimate 
zj derived from external estimates yi of ξi 
related to ξj. 
It is, therefore, an iterative 
algorithm, comprising the following steps: 
First, we estimate the latent variables based 
on the external model (each latent variable 
is estimated based on manifest variables of 
the block) 
 
Where the coefficient  
represents the external weight. 
Then, we estimate latent variables 
based on the internal model (each latent 
variable is estimated based on other latent 
variables that are related). 
 
Where  is the internal weight which is 
defined by choosing a schematic structural 
calculation. 
In a following step, we establish a 
relationship between the two types of 
estimates for determining the external final 
weight: wij = cov (Xij, zj)  
We repeat theses three steps until 
convergence in the estimates of the latent 
variable. 
- The estimation of structural 
equation 
Once scores (external final 
estimate) are obtained, we estimate the 
coefficient of internal model using multiple 
regression classics (MCO) or PLS. Indeed, 
the structural equations are estimated by 
replacing each latent variable by external 
estimate. 
In this study, the relationship of the 
PLS algorithm is estimated using the PLS 
regression instead of OLS regression. 
Indeed, for two blocks of variables X and 
Y, the OLS regression explains the 
variable Y at the expense of variable X. It 
can produce aberrant signs and 
insignificant coefficients. Contrary, PLS 
regression explains both Y and X. It solves 
the problem of multicollinearity with the 
construction of major components. 
 
IV. Results and interpretation 
We perform PLS-PM analysis 
involving only reflective indicators for the 
inner estimation. Since each reflective 
block represents only one latent construct, 
it needs to be one-dimensional. This is why 
a preliminary exploratory analysis for 
verifying the composite reliability of 
blocks is required. Two different measures 
are available to test block one-
dimensionality in PLS-PM framework: 
Dillon-Goldstein’s rho and Cronbach’s 
alpha. According to Chin (1998), Dillon-
Goldstein’s rho is considered a better 
indicator than Cronbach’s alpha as it is 
based on the results from the model rather 
than on the correlations observed between 
the manifest variables in the dataset.  
Following Werts et al. (1974), a block is 
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considered homogeneous if this index is 
greater than 0.7 . 
The results of composite reliability 
test are resumed in table 2. Since the 
Dillon-Goldstein Rho index is always 
greater than 0.7 we can deduce that all six 
blocks of manifest variables can be 
considered one dimensional.  
Table 2. Composite Reability
Another method of assessing the 
discriminant validity is to compare the 
square root of average variance extracted 
(AVE) for each construct with the 
correlation between the construct and other 
constructs in the model. The measures are 
considered to have adequate discriminant 
validity if the square root of the AVE for 
each construct is larger than the correlation 
between the construct and any other 
construct in the model. As shown in Table 
3, all constructs in the estimated model 
also fulfill this condition of discriminate 
validity. 
 
Table 3. Correlation among Construct 
Scores
Notes: The bold diagonal figures are the square root 
of the average variance extracted; the off-diagonal 
figures are the correlations of the latent construct 
 
Once the composite reliability is verified, 
we may look at the relationships between 
each manifest variable and its own latent 
variable. In table 4 we present the weights 
of the relationships between each manifest 
variable and its own latent variable, 
together with the standardized loadings. 
On the same table we report also average 
communality index that measure the ability 
of each latent variable to explain its own 
manifest variables. Since this index is 
always higher than 0.5, we can conclude 
that globally all the latent variables are 
powerful at explaining their own manifest 
variables. A low value in a loading factor 
suggests that the indicator has little relation 
to the associated construct. All indicators 
of a block of variables must reflect the 
same construct.  
The normalized weight measure the 
impact of the corresponding manifest 
variable in computing the latent variable 
Latent 
Variable
s 
Dimensio
ns 
Alpha de 
Cronbac
h 
Rho de 
D.G. 
(ACP) 
Critical 
Value 
Eigenval
ues 
Macro 
subsidiar
ies 
3 
 
0,890 0,888 1,685 
     
0,844 
     
0,099 
Macro 
parent 
2 0,067 0,993 0,774 1,605 
     
0,643 
Subsidia
ries 
fundame
ntals 
5 
 
0,917 0,829 1,811 
     
0,714 
     
0,403 
     
0,227 
     
0,054 
Parent 
fundame
ntals 
5 0,059 0,844 1,311 1,529 
     
0,979 
     
0,362 
     
0,158 
     
0,124 
Loan 
strategy 
1 
 
0,730 0,749 1,319 
Market 
disciplin
e 
1 0,106 0,857 1,135 1,477 
 
Macro 
subsidia
ries 
Macro 
parent 
Subsidi
aries 
fundam
entals 
Parent 
fundam
entals 
Loan 
strategy 
Market 
discipli
ne 
Macro 
subsidia
ries 
0,251      
Macro 
parent 
0,119 0,520     
Subsidi
aries 
dpecific 
0,101 0,238 0,210 
   
Parent 
specific 
0,172 0,157 0,171 0,133 
  
Loan 
strategy 
0,156 0,026 0,192 0,089 0,234 
 
Market 
discipli
ne 
0,034 0,162 0,081 0,116 0,153 0,490 
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score as an index and the standardized 
loadings. The results show that the 
manifest variable GDP Growth is the most 
important driver in computing the latent 
variable Macro variables of host countries. 
The same occurs for manifest variable 
Total Asset with respect to the latent 
variable Specific Subsidiaries, and for 
latent variable Parent specific with the two 
manifest variables total asset and ROE. 
Among fundamental variables of the 
subsidiary, only the variable exchange rate 
does not significantly affect the latent 
variable Specific subsidiary. The variable 
loan loss provision has a significantly 
negative effect on the latent variables of 
the subsidiary. 
 
Table 4. Normalized outer weights and 
average communalities 
Table 5. shows that the goodness of fit 
index1 for both the structural and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
1A global criterion of goodness-of-fit 
(GoF) can be given (Espisit., 2008) by the 
geometric mean of the average communality and 
 
 
measurement models are satisfactory with 
an absolute GoF value of 0.523 and an 
equal contribution of measurement model 
in constructing it. The relative GoF is very 
high. So are inner and outer models GoF. 
 
Table 5. Goodness of fit index for the 
hole model 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 
 
the average R2: 
 
Variable 
latent 
Manifest 
Variables Loadings 
Normalized 
outer 
Weights 
 Averagev 
Communalit
y 
Macro 
subsidiaries 
SGDPgrow
th 
1,042
** 
0,905 
 
SExchange 
-
1,377 
0,026 
 
Sconcentrat
ion 
-
0,010
* 
0,055 0,541 
Macro 
parent 
PGDPgrow
th 
4,427
** 
0,833 
 
Crisis 
0,077
* 
0,166 0,628 
Subsidiarie
s Specific 
StotalAsset
s 
4,981
** 
0,715 
 
Sequity 
2,354
* 
0,103 
 
SloanLoss 
-
1,785
** 
0,037 
 
SROE 
2,982
* 
0,103 
 
Sliquidity 1,254 0,040 0,587 
Parent 
specific 
PtotalAsset
s 
3,258
** 
0,477 
 
Pequity 
1,249
* 
0,051 
 
PloanLoss 
-
0,955
** 
0,097 0,721 
PROE 
4,111
** 
0,131 
 
Pliquidity 
-
1,281
* 
0,041 
 
 
Loan 
strategy SIoan 
1,767
** 
1,000 0,591 
Market 
discipline 
SbankDepo
sits 
-
0,184
** 
0,136 0,570 
 
GoF 
GoF 
(Bootstrap
) 
Borne 
inférieure 
(95%) 
Borne 
supérieure 
(95%) 
Absolu 0,523 0,526 0,515 0,584 
Relatif 0,842 0,844 0,811 0,876 
Modèle 
externe 
0,869 0,869 0,848 0,882 
Modèle 
interne 
0,978 0,9769 0,948 0,985 
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After checking the reliability and 
validity of the relationship between 
manifest and latent variables, we present in 
the following the results of the structural 
model and the relationships between latent 
variables. Since the PLS approach is 
distribution free, the nonparametric 
bootstrap procedure is used to estimate the 
t-statistics and the significance levels for 
the structural path coefficients (Chin, 
1998). 
Let’s first study factors affecting 
loans strategy of subsidiaries in emerging 
market. The results of structural model 
with Δloans as the dependent variable are 
summarized in figure 22. 
 
Figure 2. Results of PLS Estimation for 
the Theoretical Model (a) 
The regression coefficients and 
associated T-Values are shown on the links 
(arrows) between exogenous and 
endogenous latent variables. The 
constructs in the model have both small 
and large effects on loans growth. The 
results show that the proposed model for 
loan growth has a R-square of 0.328. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
2 To simplify the figure we do not present the regression results 
of exogenous latent variables on the variable Δdeposit. 
Additionally, the R-squares for the 
outcome constructs of parent and 
subsidiaries fundamentals variables are 
0.262 and 0.231 respectively.  
A positive effect was found for the 
built variables Parent and Subsidiaries 
fundamentals on loans growth with 
coefficients of 0.329 and 0.271 
respectively.  This imply that the strategy 
of loans supply of subsidiaries in emerging 
countries depends more heavily on 
fundamentals of the parent bank rather 
than on specific variables of subsidiaries. 
We deduce that the liquidity of the 
subsidiaries is centrally managed at the 
parent bank and credit supply of 
subsidiaries depends primary on the 
financial situation of its parent bank. 
Other relationships, that justifies 
our use of PLS Path approach, can be 
highlighted and falling multicollinearity 
problems between variables. In particular, 
the specific variables of the subsidiary 
appear strongly affected by macro-
economic characteristics of the home 
country. Parent bank appears also strongly 
influenced by maco-economic variables of 
the Let’s study the results of the structural 
model estimates. Table 6 shows the 
correlation and regression Path coefficients 
linking each exogenous latent variable to 
the endogenous Loan strategy. The 
interpretation of this table should be done 
in conjunction with Table 3 which presents 
the loading factors. We can conclude that 
all path coefficient estimates of the 
structural model are significant.  
Looking at the path coefficients, we 
note that credit growth of the subsidiary 
mainly depend on macroeconomic 
conditions of the country of origin. (Path 
coefficient = 0.564 and contribution to R² 
higher than 55%). This mean that changes 
in aggregate claims on home countries 
explain a significant share of the variance 
in the dependent variable country of origin. 
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Table 6.  Impact and contribution of 
exogenous latent variables on the Table 
Table 7. Goodness of fit index for the 
structural model 
endogenous ΔLoans
 
The variable GDP is the most important 
variable among the macroeconomic 
variables of the country of origin which is 
the most relevant group affecting credit 
growth of subsidiaries. This confirms that 
the transmission of liquidity shocks’ across 
countries is intensified by the foreign 
subsidiaries in emerging countries. This 
result contradict those of Classens and 
Horen (2009), who document that the 
income level of the home country does not 
significantly affect the supply of loans of 
conventional subsidiaries banks.  
From table 3 and 6, the manifest 
variable exchange rate also matter for the 
construct subsidiaries fundamentals but at 
lower degrees. This corroborates the 
results of Cook and Devereux (2011) who 
argue that the exchange rate exacerbates 
the impact of shocks in a liquidity trap for 
conventional banks that are increasingly 
affected by a systemic risk with the 
opening of capital markets. Parent banks’ 
fundamental seems to be crucial in 
establishing the potency of the bank 
lending channel since Loan growth is 
significantly related to specific variables of 
parent bank. Especially bank capitalization 
of the parent bank positively affects credit 
growth of the subsidiary while loan loss 
provision has a negative effect on the latent 
construct Parent Fundamentals, which 
allows us to deduce that the financial 
situation of parent bank reduces loans of 
subsidiary in the emerging countries. 
The combination of the two results 
that credit growth of subsidiaries depends 
on the overall strategy of the parent bank 
and the fact that it also depends on the 
macroeconomic conditions of the country 
allow as deducing that credit supply in 
emerging markets may contract due to 
economic downturn in developed 
countries. Accordingly, the foreign 
subsidiaries will result in a destabilizing 
role in the emerging country. 
These findings evidence the 
theoretical mechanisms of the relationship 
between foreign banks and economic 
stability of the host country who argue that 
subsidiaries of foreign banks depend 
heavily on the decision of their parent 
banks with a globally diversified portfolio 
of assets. Indeed, in line with the results of 
Stein (1997), parent banks can play the 
role of lender of last resort in times of 
crisis. It can also manage an internal 
capital market operations and centralized 
allocate capital and liquidity of its 
subsidiaries. This helps to stabilize the 
supply of credit by foreign banks in the 
host country when foreign branches are 
facing financial shocks. Subsidiaries of 
foreign banks may be able to recover 
  
Macro 
parent 
Parent 
specific 
Macro 
subsidiar
ies 
Subsidiar
ies 
specific 
Corrélati
on 0,161 0,001 0,005 0,043 
Path 
coefficie
nt 0,564 0,262 0,129 0,231 
t-statistic 3,140 0,245 0,562 0,645 
Contribu
tion au 
R² (%) 55,529 6,81 9,309 28,352 
R² R²(Bootstrap) Ecart-
type 
Borne 
inférieure 
(95%) 
Borne 
supérieure 
(95%) 
0,524 0,527 0,034 0,518 0,557 
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relatively quickly, compared to domestic 
banks. 
The fact that macro-economic 
conditions of the host country doesn’t 
affect significantly credit supply of 
subsidiaries shows that in period of crisis 
in home country, parent bank can supports 
its subsidiary by providing  necessary 
liquidity. In this case the subsidiary may 
play the role of stabilizer in the host 
country.  
 
Foreign subsidiaries and 
market’s discipline 
 
To examine the existence of market 
discipline on subsidiaries in emerging 
markets, we use the same set of variables 
employed in the previous section. We 
measure market discipline by the manifest 
variable; ΔDeposits. The market must have 
the power to restore stability to the banking 
system through the behavior of depositors 
against the risk that outstanding. The 
reaction of depositors results in an effect 
on deposits of subsidiaries. 
 
Figure 33 shows general results of 
structural model with Δdeposit as 
endogenous variable.  It’s shown that 
market discipline is strongly affected by 
the specific characteristics of the 
subsidiary (Path coef = 0.579).  The 
fundamental variables of the parent bank 
also significantly affect market discipline 
but at lower degrees. Macroeconomic 
variables of the host emerging country 
have an impact on market discipline as 
opposed to macro variables of the country 
of origin which appear globally 
uninformative about the mechanism 
through which depositors exert market 
discipline on foreign subsidiaries in 
emerging countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
3 In a concern of simplicity, only the regression 
results of exogenous latent variables on the 
variable deposit are shown in this figure. 
 
Figure 3. Results of PLS 
Estimation for the Theoretical Model (b)  
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The results of PLS path regression of the 
structural model with market discipline as 
dependent variable are resumed in table 8. 
The results confirm the existence of market 
discipline exerted by emerging countries. 
It’s shown that the specific variables of the 
subsidiary depositors on their foreign 
subsidiaries in affect more significantly 
market discipline than the specific 
variables of the parent bank and 
contributes to 65% of the R-Squard of the 
model. 
Table 8.  Impact and contribution of 
exogenous latent variables on the 
endogenous ΔDeposits 
Table 9.  Goodness of fit index for the 
structural model 
R² 
R²(Boot
strap) 
Ecart-
type 
Borne 
inférieu
re 
(95%) 
Borne 
supérie
ure 
(95%) 
0,007 0,019 0,010 0,006 0,046 
 
 
 
The construct specific variable of 
subsidiary appears the group that most 
affects the market discipline exerted on 
foreign subsidiaries. This means that 
depositors are more concerned with the 
risk taken by the subsidiaries in host 
country than risk taken by their parent 
banks. Macroeconomic variables of parent 
bank, globally, have insignificant effect on 
market discipline of their subsidiaries.  
As the total equity positively 
affects the latent variable Specific 
subsidiaries, then we can deduce that the 
capitalization of the subsidiary bank is a 
determining factor of deposit growth. This 
may be explained by the fact that 
strengthening the capital of the bank is 
likely to restore confidence of depositors 
and to insure convergence of interests with 
depositors.  By the same, loan loss 
provision negatively affects specific 
variables of the subsidiaries (see table 3). 
So, high level of loan loss provision 
reduces deposits of subsidiaries. This may 
be due to the fact that problems 
encountered by the parent bank on its loan 
portfolio leads it to reduce its funding to its 
subsidiaries. Thus, if the parent bank seeks 
to preserve its liquidity crisis in the country 
of origin, their subsidiaries generally 
experience a reduction in their deposits.  
On further analysis, an increase in loan 
loss provisions should be associated with a 
higher expected write-off and therefore 
should indicate a riskier institution. So, 
higher level of loan loss provisions is not 
viewed as a better protection. 
Parent bank significantly affects 
deposit growth. This result challenges the 
limited role of the parent bank to support 
their subsidiaries in times of crisis in the 
receiving country. This finding is in line to 
that of Allen et al. (2010) who show that in 
times of crisis, parent banks support their 
  
Subsidia
ries 
specific 
Macro 
subsidiar
ies 
Parent 
specific 
Macro 
parent 
Corrélati
on 0,070 0,020 0,026 -0,045 
Path 
coefficie
nt 0,579 0,294 0,121 -0,017 
t-statistic 2,350 3,713 2,297 0,215 
Contribu
tion au 
R² (%) 65,019 21,748 8,721 4,512 
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subsidiaries in host countries which 
reassure depositors. Parent banks facing 
difficult financial situations can engage 
their subsidiaries in gathering deposits 
more aggressively especially in times of 
crisis.  
Similarly, we can infer that 
liquidity of parent banks it significantly 
increases the deposits in foreign 
subsidiaries in the period of crisis. This is 
may be explained by the fact that 
depositors can expect that the parent bank 
supports their subsidiaries by providing 
them with a sufficient liquidity in order to 
fulfill their obligations at maturity. Being 
persuaded to withdraw their funds without 
incurring losses, the depositors increase 
their deposits in subsidiaries. 
From this synthesis we argue that 
financial sectors in emerging countries are 
relatively small compared to those of 
developed countries, if the subsidiary has a 
substantial market share in the host 
country, it will be more inclined to bailout 
to limit systemic consequences. This fact 
creates the permissive to increased risk-
taking by the subsidiary conditions. This 
situation is particularly damaging as the 
supervisor of the developed country is 
discharged of its responsibilities on the 
host country of the subsidiary and has little 
incentive to control the transfer of risk 
from the parent bank to its subsidiary. 
 
I. Conclusion 
 
The presence of foreign banks in 
emerging countries can be a source of 
destabilization in emerging countries and 
may constitute a channel for the 
transmission of liquidity shocks. In this 
study our aim was to investigate factors 
affecting the credit strategy of foreign 
banks in emerging countries. We apply a 
PLS-Path model that allows us to indentify 
the causal relationships between the 
various groups of variables. An interesting 
result derived from our study that foreign 
bank lending is determined by the specific 
financial variables of the parent bank and 
macroeconomic variables of the country of 
origin. The internal capital market group 
can carry instability when the parent 
reallocates liquidity. This leads us to 
conclude that the expansion of credit via 
foreign banks can poses problems of 
financial stability authorities of the host 
country.  
Our purpose was also to test 
whether depositors exert market discipline 
on foreign subsidiaries. We tried to 
identify factors that may explain the 
behavior of depositors. We show that 
specific variable of subsidiary is the group 
that most affects the market discipline 
exerted on foreign subsidiaries. This 
implies that the behavior of depositors is 
more affected by the risks taken by the 
subsidiaries in the receiving country. 
Despite the fact that the parent bank affects 
the strategies of their subsidiaries in 
developing countries, it does not affect the 
behavior of depositors. 
One way to address weaknesses of 
banking sector in emerging countries is to 
submit banks to market discipline. This can 
be by promoting other financial 
intermediaries that will compete with 
banks or by developing efficient capital 
markets so that depositors receive 
information and their responses will be 
reflected on the share price of the bank on 
the market. 
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